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Rationales for Detention: Security Threats 
and Intelligence Value 
Ryan Goodman* 
I n the armed conflict with AI Qaeda inside and outside Afghanistan, I the US government has had to grapple with difficult legal issues concerning who can 
be detained. In this brief essay, I discuss whether US practices have been consistent 
with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Three specific issues are considered. The 
first is a th reshold question: Does LOAC regulate who can be detained in a non-
international armed conflict? After cond uding that it does, I address two questions 
that implicate the substantive criteria for detention. First, is it lawful to detain civil-
ians who have not directly participated in hostilities? Second, is it lawfu1 to detain 
individuals for a long or indefinite period for the purpose of gathering intelligence? 
Since September 11, the US government has adjusted its detention practices to 
overcome various legal defects. These three issues remain among the fundamental 
challenges to the detention regime. 
It is not obvious that LOAC regulates the substantive grounds for detention in 
non -international armed confli ct. Neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Pro-
tocol II explicitly addresses the subject. They contain no language expressly pro-
hibiting arbitrary detention or unlawful confinement. Similarly, the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court includes "unlawful confinement" in a list of 
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war crimes in international armed conilict.2 Unlawful confinement, however, is 
conspicuously absent from the Statute's list of war crimes in non-international 
armed conflict. Additionally, a 2004 expert meeting-which included Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Knut Dormann, Robert Goldman, Walter Kalin, Judge Theodore 
Meron, Sir Nigel Rodleyand Jelena PejiC---concludes that LOAC does not contain 
rules precluding unlawful confinement in non-international armed conflicts: 
Non -International Armed ConJ1ids 
The experts noted that there are no provisions requiring certain reasons for detention, 
nor any procedures to prevent unnecessary detention. It was further observed that 
there are no specific supervisory mechanisms other than the minimal requirement that 
the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Crossl be allowed to offer its services. It 
was stated, therefore, that only national law is relevant, as well as international human 
rights law.) 
Some legal advisers at the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRe) 
have helped support this view. A presentation at the 2004 meeting by Donnann, 
Deputy Head of the Legal Division of the JCRC, states: " International hwnanitar-
ian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts contains no provisions re-
quiring certain grounds for detentionlinternment nor are there any procedures 
defined to check the need for such detention."4 An important article in the Intema-
tional Review of the Red Cross by Je1ena Pej ic, Legal Adviser in the JCRC Legal Divi-
sion, is more equivocal. She states: 
In non-international armed conflicts there is even less clarity as to how administrative 
detention is to be organized. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, which is 
applicable as a minimum standard to all non-international armed conflicts, contains 
no provisions regulating internment, i.e. administrative detention for security reasons, 
apart from the requirement of humane treatment.5 
Pejic does not elaborate whether or to what extent the requirement of humane 
treatment might directly regulate the use of security rationales or other grounds for 
confinement. 
Many of these experts find some solace in the notion that gaps in LOAC are in-
tolerable (else a legal black hole) and that those gaps would be filled by interna-
tional human rights law. The 2004 expert meeting. in which Pejic, Dormann and 
others participated, concludes: 
The experts stated that as IHL does not provide procedural guarantees to persons 
detained during non-international armed conflict, human rights standards must 
always apply . .. . The general view was that instead of trying to amend humanitarian 
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law to remedy its failings, the standards applicable to non-international armed conflict 
should be those of hwnan rights law and subject to human rights remedies. 6 
International human rights law, however, is not accorded the same legal (or sym-
bolic) weight in US law and practice as the Geneva Conventions or customary in-
ternational humanitarian law. Hence, the exclusion of LOAC from this domain 
would leave a substantial void in the definition and regulation of impermissible 
behavior. 
According to the weight oflegal authority, however, no such gap exists. Unlaw-
ful confmement is prohibited by Common Article 3 (e.g., as a form of inhumane 
treatment) and by customary international humanitarian law. Under the frame-
work set forth in Common Article 3, the power to detain is subject to a nwnber of 
substantive constraints. First, individuals cannot be detained on discriminatory 
grounds such as "race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria."7 Second, parties to a conflict are prohibited from taking hostages. 
According to the ICRC Commentary, that prohibition is based on a fundamental 
principle of justice: 
The taking of hostages, like reprisals, to which it is often the prelude, is contrary to the 
modern idea of justice in that it is based on the principle of collective responsibility fo r 
crime. Both strike at persons who are innocent of the crime which it is intended to 
prevent or punish.8 
In other words, if a person does not bear individual responsibility for a security 
threat to the State, he should not be deprived of his liberty, even if confining him 
could prevent the threat from materializing. Third, Common Article 3 prohibits 
the passing of a sentence without affording fundamental judicial guarantees, and 
that provision implicitly restricts the use of administrative detention for punitive 
purposes. 
More generally, unlawful confmement is prohibited by a broad-based obliga-
tion under Common Article 3: hors de combat "shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely."9 Indeed, the recent 2005 JCRC study on customary international hu-
manitarian law states that, asa matter of treaty law, "arbitrary deprivation ofliberty 
is not compatible" with humane treatment under Common Article 3. 10 Joanna 
Dingwall argues persuasively that Common Article 3 prohibits unlawful confine-
ment as a form of "cruel treatment. "II And, the overriding obligation of h umane 
treatment is even more clearly and directly connected to the sources that Dingwall 
invokes. 12 As an analytic matter, these interpretations of humane treatment are not 
precluded by the existence of text explicitly prohibiting unlawful confine-
ment in international conflicts, but the absence of text referring to unlawful 
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confinement in Common Article 3. Rape is not explicitly prohibited by Common 
Article 3 either; yet it is well understood that rape is covered by the article. n The 
protections codified in Common Article 3 are simply written in broader terms. 
International authorities also suggest that unlawful confinement is prohibited 
in non-international armed conflict as a matter of customary international law. In 
considering the practices of armed opposition groups in Colombia's civil war, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated: "International humanitar-
ian law also prohibits the detention or internment of civilians except where neces-
sary for imperative reasons of securi ty."14 Liesbeth Zegveld also reports that the 
UN Commission on Human Rights drew from international humanitarian law ap-
plicable to international armed conflicts in demanding armed opposition groups 
refrain from arbitrary detention in Afghanistan ( 1993) and in the Sudan (1995).15 
In addition, Article 3 of the Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Stan-
dards proscribes the disappearance of individuals, "including their abduction or 
unacknowledged detention. "16 And Article 11 of the Turku Declaration includes 
an implicit restriction on substantive grounds for detention: "If it is considered 
necessary for imperative reasons of security to subject any person to assigned resi-
dence, internment or administrative detention, such decisions shall be subject to a 
regular procedure prescribed by law .. . . "17 
Once the question whether LOAC prohibits arbitrary detention is resolved in 
the affirmative, a second-order question is whether LOAC permits the administra-
tive detention of civilians, including civilians who do not directly participate in 
hostili ties. 18 That question has arisen in recent litigation, and federal judges have 
been divided on the issue.19 The Fourth Geneva Convention rules on internment 
are the most directly relevant in this regard.2o And, in accordance with Articles 5, 
27, 41-43 and 78 of the Civilians Convention, States are permitted to detain not 
only civilians who directly participate in hostilities (e.g., unlawful combatants) but 
also civilians whose indired participation in hostilities poses a securi ty threat. At 
first blush, US practices in the conflict with AI Qaeda do not necessitate making 
such distinctions. The US government has formally claimed the authority, in 
legislation21 and in executive action,22 to detain only "unlawful combatants." How-
ever, the government's peculiar definition of "combatants" and its actual deten-
tion decisions betray a contrary policy of detaining civilians who have, at most, 
indirectly participated in hostilities.23 
Although LOAC does not forbid the detention of this broader class of civilians, 
domestic law might. For example. an important constitutional distinction may ex-
ist with respect to classes of individuals who can be subject to military jurisdiction. 
The constitutional line may be drawn between "combatants" (including direct 
participants in hostilities) and civilians, and LOAC should help define the 
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boundaries of those groups for constitutional purposes. Indeed, if the government 
wishes to detain individuals in the latter group, it may be required to adopt laws ex-
plicitly subjecting "civilians" to detention. The basis for that dear statement rule 
would derive from domestic law, however, and not LOAC itself. 
A remaining question is whether the United States can detain individuals, on a 
long-term or indefinite basis, for the purpose of gathering intelligence. Before ana-
lyzing that question oflaw, first consider the record of US detention practices fol-
lowing September 11. The government has used intelligence value as a ground for 
initial internment decisions, as well as for denying release. Former Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Professor Matthew Waxman recently 
wrote: " Intelligence gathering through questioning of those in custody constitutes 
another important reason for detention in warfare, and especially in fighting ter-
rorist networks. "24 With respect to the global sphere of operations, the 2006 Coun-
terinsurgency Field Manual states that information gathering provides a reason for 
detaining two classes of individuals: (1) "persons who have engaged in, or assisted 
those who engage in, terrorist or insurgent activities" and (2) "persons who have 
incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and terrorist activity, but 
who are not guilty of associating with such groups. "25 Notably, information gath-
ering appears to be an independent basis for detaining the first category of individ-
uals even if they no longer pose a securi ty threat.26 However, for the second 
category, the Counterinsurgency manual states: "Since persons in the second cate-
gory have not engaged in criminal or insurgent activities, they must be released, 
even if they refuse to provide information. "21 It stands to reason that individuals in 
the first category could be denied release if they refuse to provide information. As 
another component of global operations, President George Bush announced that 
under the CIA's secret detention program "[m]any are released after questioning, 
or turned over to local authorities-if we determine that they do not pose a contin-
uing threat and no longer have significant intelligence value."28 
With respect to detention in Guantanamo specifically, in determining whether 
a detainee should be transferred to the base, US military screening teams and the 
combatant commander must consider " the possible intelligence that may be 
gained from the detainee."29 And administrative review boards (ARB) may con-
sider whether a detainee "is of continuing intelligence value" in deciding whether 
to recommend release.30 That standard appears to regularize practices that pre-
dated the ARB process.31 Although stated in a summary fashion, a joint report by 
UN human rights officials concerning Guantanamo concludes "that the objective 
of the ongoing detention is not primarily to prevent combatants from taking up 
arms against the United States again, but to obtain infonnation and gather intelli-
gence on the Al-Qaeda network. "32 
375 
Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence Value 
Within the United States, the cases of individuals such as Jose Padilla and Ali 
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri suggest that intelligence value may constitute a dominant 
rationale for detention. In Padilla's case, the Solicitor General argued before the 
Supreme Court that "It lhe detention of enemy combatants serves two vital pur-
poses directly connected to prosecuting the war. First, detention prevents captured 
combatants from rejoining the enemy and continuing the fight. Second, detention 
enables the military to gather critical intelligence from captured combatants con-
cerning the capabilities and intentions of the enemy."}} For the latter proposition, 
the Solicitor General cited and included, as an appendix to his brief, a declaration 
by Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.34 The 
Jacoby Declaration focuses on the need to obtain information from the detainee as 
the basis for military confinement outside of the criminal justice system.3S In al-
Marri's case, federal judges expressed concern over the apparent interrogation-
based reasons for transferring the petitioner from criminal jurisdiction to military 
administrative detention: 
[N]ot only has the Government offered no other explanation [than interrogation 
purposes] for abandoning al-Marri's prosecution, it has even propounded an affidavit 
in support of aI-Marri's continued military detention, stating that he "possesses 
information of high intelligence value." See Rapp. Declaration. Moreover, former 
AttorneyGenerai John Ashcroft has explained that the Government decided to declare 
al-Marri an enemy combatant only after he became a "hard case" by "reject[ing] 
numerous offers to improve his lot by ... providing information." John Ashcroft, 
Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice 168-69 (2006).36 
Professor Marty Lederman, a leading expert on US detention policy since September 
II , summarizes his view of the overall scheme: "Unlike in past conflicts, when the 
purpose of detention was incapacitation of actual combatants so that they could not 
fight against us, the dominant purpose of this detention regime is intelligence-
gathering. "37 
It is important to recognize that intelligence value has also constituted an inde-
pendent basis for administrative detention in Iraq.}8 Consider Lieutenant Andru 
Wall's account of detainee operations: 
Officially, individuals could be detained fo r their intelligence value for no more than 72 
hours; however, anecdotal evidence suggested that longer intelligence detentions were 
common. The argwnent in favor of intelligence detentions was that, for example, if an 
individual knew who was responsible for carrying out attacks on Coalition Forces ... 
then withholding [this information] constituted an imperative threat to the security of 
Coalition Forces .. . . The argument against such detentions was that the individual 
himself did not pose an imperative security threat. 39 
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Other reports also find that intelligence value constituted a-formal and infor-
mal-ground fo r detention in Iraq.40 
Three arguments might be raised to support the legality of US practice. First, the 
Geneva Conventions contain no express prohibition on the use of detention for 
intelligence-gathering purposes. Second, detention is permitted if obtaining the 
relevant information serves an imperative security interest. Third, if a State has the 
authority to detain an individual until the cessation of hostilities, the State has the 
prerogative to release her earlier if she provides valuable intelligence information. 
At the outset in addressing these arguments we should note that an express pro-
vision of the Geneva Conventions may not be necessary if the regime implicitly 
contemplates that the only basis for detention is to prevent individuals returning to 
the fight. A customary norm may also suffice if treaties do not. And, even ifLOAC 
permits interrogation incidental to detention, it does not necessarily permit deten-
tion for the purpose of interrogation. Nor does it permit coercive interrogation. 
Let's turn to an elaboration of some of these points and other points as well. 
First, all three arguments are contradicted by legal authorities that have ad-
dressed the subject with respect to the general LOAC regime. The ICRC publicly 
criticized the use ofGuantanamo for interrogation purposes.4 ! The joint report of 
UN officials declared: "The indefinite detention of prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees for purposes of continued interrogation is inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions."42 And a plurality of the US Supreme Court stated in 
dicta: "Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interroga-
tion is not authorized."43 Some commentators have suggested that the plurality's 
statement isconclusory and without citation to legal authority. However, in earlier 
passages, the opinion references authorities suggesting that detention is permitted 
exclusively to prevent individuals returning to the battlefield.44 US policy, accord-
ingly, contradicts the collective judgment of the US Supreme Court (in a plurality 
opinion), the ICRC and UN human rights officials. 
Second, other provisions of the Geneva Conventions indirectly support the 
conclusion that indefinite or long-term detention is permitted only to prevent in-
dividuals returning to the battlefield. In general, detaining powers argue against 
early release of prisoners of war on the ground that the individuals might return to 
the fight. However, some detainees are too sick or wounded to return to the battle-
field.4s A valuable question for our purposes is whether the detaining power could 
nevertheless hold the individual to gather intelligence. The Prisoner of War 
(POW) Convention is clear; it places a categorical obligation to repatriate such in-
dividuals to their home countries. 46 There is no exception for detaining or preclud-
ing release of individuals on any other grounds such as intelligence value. 
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Third, the most relevant rules may not be found directly in provisions regulat-
ing detention. The most relevant source may be found in rules governing interro-
gation. And those interrogation rules preclude the initial decision to detain an 
individual, as well as the purported prerogative to order release of a detainee who 
provides information. More specifically, the use of intelligence value violates Arti-
cle 17 of the POW Convention and Article3 1 of the Civilians Convention. Both ar-
ticles strictly prohibit physical and moral coercion to obtain information from 
detainees.47 Accordingly, individuals who are interrogated should not receive 
better treatment (release from detention) or worse treatment (continued confine-
ment ) on the basis of whether they provide or withhold information. In short, the 
relevant LOAC rules are found more directly in provisions regulating methods of 
interrogations, rather than provisions regulating grounds for detention. Notably, 
the former constitutes an independent basis for the application of LOAC in non-
international armed conflicts. That is, even if LOAC does not regulate unlawful 
confinement in non -international armed conflict, it undoubtedly regulates coer-
cive interrogations. 
Fourth, an individual's possession of infonnation does not constitute a valid se-
curity rationale for internment under the Civilians Convention. According to the 
ICRC Commentary, States have significant discretion to define activities that 
threaten their security.-48 The Commentary, however, also suggests that the individ-
uals must themselves directly pose the threat. The paradigmatic examples provided 
by the Commentary include" [s J ubversive activity carried on inside the terri tory of 
a Party to the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy 
Power."49 More specific examples include "members of organizations whose ob-
ject is to cause disturbances, or .. . [individuals who] may seriously prejudice itsse-
curity by other means, such as sabotage or espionage."so Moreover, as described 
above, various authorities, including the ICRC, UN human rights officials and the 
Supreme Court, have repudiated intelligence-based grounds for detention . Those 
rejections were absolute and were issued in the context of securi ty-based reasons 
for gathering intelligence. 
Finally, the implications of allowing intelligence value as an independent 
ground for long-tenn or indefinite detention are intolerable. Doing so might per-
mit the confinement of individuals, such as the children or other family members 
of combatants, who have no engagement in hostilities b ut have personal knowl-
edge about the combatants. It might also permit the confinement of innocent de-
tainees who do not have information themselves but are held as bargaining chips to 
coerce other individuals to provide information. And, a further implication is sug-
gested by the declaration of Admiral Jacoby. He contends that " the intelligence cy-
cle is contin uous. This dynamic is especially important in the War on Terrorism. 
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There is a constant need to ask detainees new lines of questions as additional de-
tainees are taken into custody and new information is obtained from them and 
from other intelligence-gathering methods."S\ That justification essentially pro-
vides for continuing to hold individuals even if they have exhausted their current 
intelligence value. In sum, it is not too much of a stretch to suggest that "detaining 
individuals on the basis of what they were believed to know could be a slippery 
slope lead ing to mass, unwarranted detentions."s2 
Since September 11, the United States has adjusted its detention practices in re-
sponse to powerful objections. Some of the remaining objections are valid and oth-
ers not. As a threshold matter, an important point is that the laws of war prohibit 
unlawful confmement in non-international armed conflict. The Obama adminis-
tration provides a new opportunity to reassess detention policy through that legal 
framework. 
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